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1. Introduction 
 
After a long consultation process, the Kingdom of Bhutan finally adopted 
its very first constitution on 18 July 2008.
1 Heralded with great fanfare in 
the country itself as a modern, forward looking accomplishment set to help 
propel Bhutan towards a democratic society,
2 the Constitution of the 
Kingdom of Bhutan is – from the point of view of international human 
rights law – a deeply disturbing document.  
While at first glance the Constitution may appear to be in harmony with 
international human rights treaties since many of its provisions seem to 
guarantee fundamental rights associated with these treaties, a closer 
examination reveals that on the contrary, it is intended to exclude vast 
segments of the population of Bhutan from being able to enjoy even the 
most basic of human rights in an attempt to ensure the dominance of 
certain ethnic groups – and the exclusion of others based solely on their 
ethnicity. All in all, this unfortunate constitutional aberration – seemingly 
welcomed in the West – makes the Land of the Dragon anything but a 
Shangri La.  
2. The Land of the Dragon 
High up in the Himalayas, Bhutan is a relatively small yet important 
meeting point for two of the world’s great spheres of civilisation: the Indo-
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http://www.constitution.bt/TsaThrim%20Eng%20(A5).pdf 
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Aryan linguistic group with its mainly Hindu or Muslim peoples, and the 
Tibeto-Burman languages where Buddhism is more prevalent. The origins, 
history and heritage for most of the Kingdom’s population are anchored in 
the Tibeto-Burman cultural sphere of influence. Before the seventeenth 
century, it would seem Bhutan was ruled by numerous clans and noble 
families closely connected with Tibet until 1616. That year saw the arrival 
of Ngawang Namgyal, a Buddhist monk from Tibet who established 
himself as the religious ruler of Bhutan with the title Shabdrung Rinpoche. 
It is through his efforts that the southern valleys were to be merged into a 
unified country called Druk Yul (Land of the Dragon) in the national 
language of Dzongkha. 
With its cultural and religious contacts with Lhasa hampered after the 
Chinese invaded Tibet in 1720 and its isolation by geography from Indian 
influence, Bhutan was able to remain aloof from most of the world until 
about the mid-eighteenth century: in 1864 the British occupied a small part 
of southern Bhutan which was formally annexed after a war in 1865, and it 
is from this time that British authorities were to exert control over 
Bhutan’s foreign affairs, as well as occupying nearby territory in Sikkim. 
These events are significant, because it may also have been the gateway 
for the influx of the country’s largest minority group, the Nepali-speaking 
and mainly Hindu Lhotshampas (this word is actually a Dzongkha word 
for ‘Southern Bhutanese’).  
After India won independence, the 1949 Treaty between India and Bhutan 
returned the part of Bhutan annexed by the British.
3 The following year’s 
occupation of Tibet by Chinese Communist forces in 1950 has been seen 
as leaving the Kingdom as the last standing bastion of an ancient cultural 
history: 
Thus of the whole enormous area which was once the spirited 
domain of Tibetan culture and religion, stretching from Ladakh in 
the west to the borders of the Chinese provinces of Szechuan and 
Yunnan in the east, from the Himalayas in the south to the 
Mongolian steppes and the vast wastes of northern Tibet, now only 
                                                 
3 Article 4: Further to mark the friendship existing and continuing between the said 
Governments, the Government of India shall, within one year from the date of signature of 
this treaty, return to the Royal Government of Bhutan about thirty-two square miles of 
territory in the area known as Dewangiri. The Government of India shall appoint a 
competent officer or officers to mark out the area so returned to the Royal Government of 
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Bhutan seems to survive as the one resolute and self-contained 
representative of a fast-disappearing civilisation.
4 
It is this fragile survival of a ‘fast-disappearing civilisation’ which may 
help explain the Bhutanese government’s policies, programmes and 
especially the adoption of a new constitution which seem to exclude any 
acknowledgment of the Kingdom’s diversity and any concession to many 
of its minorities. 
Yet the ‘fragility’ of Bhutan as a political entity, the ‘threats’ to its 
survival, and the reasons why the Royal Government of Bhutan has 
apparently gone to extremes to exclude – or at the very least discriminate 
against – many of its own only make sense in the context of a cultural, 
linguistic or religious threat, and it is here that the issue of minorities and 
the makeup of the country’s population become matters of controversy.  
In terms of the linguistic makeup of Bhutan, it would seem that until 
relatively recent times, the vast majority of the population of the kingdom 
spoke Tibeto-Burman languages. There are a number of Tibeto-Burman 
languages and dialects in use in the country, most of which are related to 
Tibetan. The most widely spoken of these are the Ngalong and Tshangla. 
The country’s only national language, Dzongkha, could be described as a 
“polished” form of the Ngalong language and has some 130,000 speakers 
according to figures available for 2003.
5 The central parts of the country 
tend to have strong links and affinities with the Ngalong. The other main 
Tibeto-Burman language, Tshangla, is mainly spoken in eastern districts 
by some 138,000 people. The people in the east are known more 
generically as Sharchops.
6 Most of the other ethnic groups in the central 
and eastern parts of the country speak one of the smaller Tibeto-Burman 
languages, such as Bumthangkha (perhaps 30,000 speakers), 
Chocangacakha (20,000), Dzalakha (15,000), Khengkha (40,000), 
Kurtokha (10,000), Lepcha (35,000), and Nyenkha (10,000), among 
others. 
The two main Tibeto-Burman population groups are thus the Ngalong, a 
people of Tibetan origin which migrated to Bhutan perhaps as early as the 
ninth century. They are concentrated in the western and northern districts 
                                                 
4 David Snellgrove and Hugh Richardson (1980), A Cultural History of Tibet, Prajna Press, 
Boulder, at p. 271. 
5  Ethnologue Report for Bhutan, available at http://www.ethnologue.com/ 
show_country.asp?name=BT. 
6  Ethnologue Report for Bhutan, estimate for 1993, available at 
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of the country and mainly practice a Tibetan style of Mahayana Buddhism. 
The Sharchops reside predominantly in eastern Bhutan and are among its 
earliest inhabitants with origins traced back to tribes of northern Burma 
and northeast India. While they also practice a Tibetan style of Mahayana 
Buddhism, they tend to belong to the Nyingma school, whereas most 
Ngalongs are of the Drukpa Kargyü school. The Buddhist population of 
the Kingdom altogether constitutes perhaps two-thirds. There are also 
some remnants of an animist and shamanistic faith called Bon which 
predates the arrival of Buddhism. The number of adherents of Bon beliefs 
is however thought to be quite small. 
The vast diversity from a cultural, religious and linguistic point of view – 
just within the broad Tibeto-Burman family - is somewhat misleading. 
Despite not constituting a majority in terms of the overall population, the 
Ngalongs and central populations have in practical terms imposed their 
modified language as the state’s only national language and it is similarly 
their culture which is deemed – almost exclusively – to be “Bhutanese”. 
The Ngalongs are clearly dominant politically and predominate in 
Government and the civil service, and their cultural norms and dress have 
been declared by the Royal Government of Bhutan to be the standard for 
all citizens. 
To this mixture must be added a much more recent arrival, perhaps some 
156,000 Nepali-speaking people,
7 the Lhotshampas, concentrated in the 
foothills of the entire length of Bhutan, especially its south central part. 
Mainly Hindus in terms of religious beliefs, they clearly belong to the 
Indo-Aryan languages and cultural group, though of course there are some 
individuals who do not necessarily fit completely in these broad 
religion/language/culture categories. There are some Hindus in the 
southern part of the country, for example, who speak other languages, such 
as Assamese, but generally it is safe to say that the majority of the 
population in parts of southern Bhutan speak Nepali and are Hindus. 
3. Controversy over Minority Population, Citizenship, and 
Refugees 
When the Lhotshampas actually started to settle in Bhutan is the subject of 
much controversy and conjecture. The debate is however more than just 
symbolic because it is central to claims of ‘ownership’ of the country. It 
                                                 
7 For ease of reference these are all described as speaking Nepali, though in fact there are a 
number of variants and dialects within this broad category. The 1993 estimate of their 
numbers is from the Ethnologue Report for Bhutan, available at 
http://www.ethnologue.com/show_country.asp?name=BT. Fernand de Varennes 
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has also become the political and legal basis for exclusion from citizenship 
of a substantial percentage of the population and even for a form of ‘ethnic 
cleansing’.  
The Royal Government of Bhutan has in the past treated the exact 
population of Bhutan as something of a secret. Before 1969, there were 
estimates of the entire population ranging between 300,000 and 900,000. A 
national census in 1969 arrived at a figure of just over one million. In the 
eighties the government put the figure in some documents at 1,165,800 and 
even 1.4 million. That number was subsequently ‘revised’ and was 
described in 1991 as being about 600,000. In 1999, the figure became 
657,548 according to the Planning Commission of the Royal Government 
of Bhutan.  
 
This apparently does not include some 125,000 Bhutanese – mainly 
Lhotshampas – refugees living in Nepal and India. Without entering the 
controversial debate as to the reasons for such a huge discrepancy in 
numbers, and whether there has been an attempt at manipulating the 
numbers in order to exclude more recent arrivals in the country from these 
population figures, one needs to keep in mind that this huge drop in the 
official population of Bhutan should at the very least be treated with some 
reserve. There is however a significant discrepancy between the population 
totals reported by the United Nations and those provided by the Royal 
Government of Bhutan, since the former placed Bhutan’s population at 1.9 
million in 1997.  
 
The case of these refugees remains extremely controversial. Most of them 
fled, were evicted or pressured to leave southern Bhutan from the early 
1990s, or were born in exile to refugee parents. As pointed out by Amnesty 
International: 
 
The refugees claim they are victims of human rights violations and 
discrimination by the Bhutan government’s ‘one nation, one 
people’ policy based on the traditions of the northern Bhutanese. 
The Bhutanese government maintains that the people in the 
refugee camps are illegal immigrants from Nepal who had 
overstayed their contracts in Bhutan or Bhutanese who left the 
country voluntarily and thus are deemed to have renounced their 
nationality under Bhutan’s citizenship law.
8 
 
                                                 
8 Amnesty International, Nationality, Expulsion, Statelessness and the Right to Return, 
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What does appear clear is that there were serious allegations of violence 
and intimidation against some of the Nepali-speaking Lhotshampas, that in 
some cases individuals were forcibly made to leave the country, and that 
government authorities do not want most of them back: 
 
As arbitrary arrests of southern Bhutanese, accompanied by torture 
and rape, escalated in 1991, southern Bhutanese began to flee from 
Bhutan, fearing that they would become victims of such violations. 
From about mid-1992, however, there were significantly fewer 
reports of these kinds of gross human rights violations being 
committed, and the nature of the action taken by the authorities to 
make people leave the country seemed to have changed. Many of 
the people interviewed who arrived in the camps in this later 
period described primarily administrative measures taken to force 
them to leave, including being required to sign so-called 
"voluntary migration forms", often accompanied by threats of 
large fines or imprisonment if they failed to comply. Signing these 
forms is taken to mean that the person concerned will not return to 
Bhutan, and there is some provision - which is not always fulfilled 
- for compensation to be paid for their lands. Some people had left 
Bhutan for another reason: this was that their village communities 
were required to leave en masse as a collective punishment 
inflicted by the local authorities following a murder or robbery in 
the locality attributed to ‘anti-nationals’.
9 
Negotiations for the return of refugees to Bhutan after their ‘verification’ 
as citizens of Bhutan led on 17 July 1993 to the formation of the Nepal-
Bhutan Joint Ministerial Level Committee (JMLC), though in 1993 both 
Nepal and Bhutan agreed to divide the refugees into four categories: 1) 
bona fide Bhutanese if they have been evicted forcefully; 2) Bhutanese 
who have emigrated; 3) non-Bhutanese people; and 4) Bhutanese who 
have committed criminal acts. Bilateral negotiations lasted until December 
2001 with the two parties agreeing to form a Joint Verification Team 
(JVT). Expectations were at that point rather high, despite some 
misgivings by the international community and various human rights 
groups who decried this categorisation and the refusal to include the 
UNHCR in this process. 
Those critical of the process seem to have been vindicated. Very few of 
these refugees will in fact return to Bhutan under this process. Only 2.5 per 
cent (293 people) out of the 12,183 refugees in Khundunabari camp in 
                                                 
9 Amnesty International, Bhutan: Forcible Exile, AI Index - ASA 14/04/94, August 1994. Fernand de Varennes 
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Nepal were determined to belong to category one, while 70 percent were 
category two, nor is there likely to be a large influx of refugees from 
category two because of the conditions linked to their return: 
People in category 2 or those forced to sign “voluntary migration 
forms” under duress and thus deemed to have left the country 
voluntarily, will be taken back to Bhutan and held in closed camps 
for a probationary period of two years. During this period one 
member of each family will be employed as a labourer in road 
construction. They will not be able to move freely in Bhutan. Their 
eligibility for citizenship after the probationary period will depend 
on their knowledge of Dzongkha, the official language, of 
Bhutanese history and culture, and their proven loyalty to the 
Bhutanese crown. If any family member leaves the camps, or 
Bhutan, during the probationary period the entire family’s 
application for citizenship will be disallowed;
10 
It would appear that current government policies are aimed at excluding 
the return of refugees who are not Buddhists and ethnically and culturally 
Drukpa. Even the sudden population ‘correction’ from 1999 seems to 
suggest an attempt to downgrade population figures which might have 
supported the claims of some that the Nepali-speaking Lhotshampas might 
have been approaching 40% or even more of the entire population of the 
country. 
When the Lhotshampas settled in Bhutan is sensitive as it buttresses many 
of the current policies and attitudes of the Royal Government of Bhutan, 
particularly those that in effect result in the denial of many basic human 
rights for minorities in Bhutan because they are not recognized as citizens. 
While most would agree that the presence of Nepali-speaking people in the 
south of the country flowed from migration for the hills of eastern Nepal, 
there are historical documents which mention the presence of Nepali-
speaking groups in nearby Sikkim before the nineteenth century.
11 Reliable 
historical data is difficult to come by, but the claims that the Nepali-
speaking population has roots going back hundreds of years in Bhutan 
appear difficult to sustain in terms of conclusive evidentiary support. There 
are nevertheless British colonial documents which do exist, some dating 
from the nineteenth century, that show an already well-established 
Lhotshampas population. In all likelihood, their migration did take place 
                                                 
10 Asian Legal Resource Centre, Prolonging the crisis of Bhutanese refugees, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/2005/NGO/52, 11 April 11 2005, 61
st session of the UN Commission on Human 
Rights, Geneva. 
11 See Michael Hutt (2003), Unbecoming Citizens: Culture, nationhood and the Flight of 
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since at least the late nineteenth century, beginning ‘some time after the 
Anglo-Bhutanese wars of 1864-6 and probably subsided after the 1930s.’
12  
 
4. Bhutan: The Legal Human Rights’ Context 
Bhutan has not only been geographically and historically speaking an 
isolated state, it has to some degree isolated itself also from the global 
human rights regime since it is at the extreme bottom list of states in terms 
of the international human rights treaties ratified: only two. Its historical 
and legal isolation has probably meant that, while many of the officials and 
leaders in Bhutan may favour some movement towards greater democracy 
and changes in society to modernize it, there must necessarily be a great 
deal of ignorance or at least misunderstanding as to what entails a truly 
democratic and open society, committed to global ideals of justice and 
tolerance and for a rights based approach in development planning. 
Especially when dealing with minorities, there may have been the 
mistaken belief that there are no standards applicable to Bhutan since it has 
not ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) which is main international treaty that contains a specific 
minority provision, Article 27.
13 To put this in very simple terms: no 
Article 27, therefore no minority rights.  
Most of what people would recognize today as “minority rights” is 
undoubtedly part of the corpus of human rights in international law. In 
matters of religious and linguistic preferences and restrictions, for 
example, minorities are protected by freedom of religion, freedom of 
expression, and especially non-discrimination. These are fundamental 
human rights, pillars in the global human rights regime. Whether dealing 
with situations involving the use of a minority language by public 
authorities (Diergaardt v. Namibia
14), stopping the government from 
banning the private use of a language (Ballantyne v. Canada
15), removing 
restrictions on religious activities, teaching in a public school in a minority 
language (Cyprus v. Turkey
16), or obtaining financial support for private 
                                                 
12 Ibid, in footnotes, p. 24. 
13 Article 27 states: ‘In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, 
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the 
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own 
religion, or to use their own language.’ 
14 UN Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 760/1997, 6 September 2000. 
15  Ballantyne, Davidson and McIntyre v. Canada, UN Human Rights Committee, 
Communications Nos. 359/1989 and 385/1989, 31 March 1993. 
16 European Court of Human Rights, Application no. 25781/94, judgment of 10 May 2001. Fernand de Varennes 
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schools for a religious minority (Waldman v. Canada
17), it is not Article 27 
that has been used successfully, but usually one of the other fundamental 
rights such as non-discrimination, freedom of religion or freedom of 
expression. 
The reason this is important is that Bhutan having (only) ratified both the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women  (CEDAW) 
cannot discriminate against these two groups and generally must ensure 
that the basic human rights of women and children are applied. This would 
apply to women and children who also happen to be members of a 
minority, and especially to Nepali-speaking individuals. Additionally, 
because fundamental rights and freedoms such as freedom of religion and 
the prohibition of racial discrimination are also part of customary law, 
Bhutan must comply with these regardless of the status of its ratification of 
a particular treaty. 
Moreover, the CRC contains a minority provision as well,
18 similar to that 
contained in the ICCPR, thus establishing a legally binding obligation on 
the Royal Government of Bhutan to comply with the human rights of 
children belonging to minority groups. Given that a high proportion of the 
Bhutanese population is below the age of 15 (42%), there is real scope for 
reaching many people through this provision.   
Among some of the most serious human rights issues to be considered here 
are: 
x  Non-discrimination and prohibition of racial discrimination (which 
directly or indirectly may include religion, language, or 
ethnicity)
19 
                                                 
17 Views of the UN Human Rights Committee, Communication 694/1996, 3 November 
1999. 
18 Article 30 states: ‘In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities or 
persons of indigenous origin exist, a child belonging to such a minority or who is 
indigenous shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of his or her 
group, to enjoy his or her own culture, to profess and practise his or her own religion, or to 
use his or her own language.’ 
19 The refusal to recognise and respect the languages and cultures of minorities, especially 
in the area of education, has been treated as involving issues of racial discrimination in a 
number of concluding recommendations by the UN Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discriminations. See for example Concluding Observations of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Botswana, 23/08/2002. CERD/C/61/CO/2002. The 
Committee also concluded that the Constitution and legislation which only recognises 
Tswana-speaking tribes is inconsistent with the Convention, especially in having the effect 
of denying land rights and other rights and privileges to members of non-Tswana-speaking 
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x  Freedom of religion 
x  Freedom of expression 
x  Right to education, including minority rights in education  
 
In practical terms, what does consideration of these standards actually 
mean in the case and rather unusual circumstances of Bhutan? Because 
human rights in international law are so general – and indeed need to be in 
order to be applicable in vastly different social and developmental contexts 
– and because of the paucity of international cases dealing precisely with 
their application to minority situations, this is not always an easy question 
to answer.  
There is however some guidance available. The work of the UN Working 
Group on Minorities can for example be a good resource. This Working 
Group reviews annually the implementation of the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities.
20 This Declaration is considered as an elaboration of 
Article 27 of the ICCPR and although not legally binding on states, it is an 
important political statement of minimum standards. The Working Group 
also holds regional meetings and produces recommendations.
21 There are 
also guidance in documents such as the Oslo Recommendations Regarding 
the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities,
22 the The Hague 
Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights of National 
Minorities,
23 and the Lund Recommendations on the Effective participation 
of National Minorities in Public Life.
24 They often contain clear and brief 
statements on the application of human rights to the situation of linguistic 
minorities, in the field of education, and in various aspects of participation 
in public life. Prepared by some of the world’s leading experts in the areas 
for the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, and only 
dealing with national minorities, they are still exportable and very useful 
because of their approach which is inherently one focused on the global 
human rights regime.
25  
                                                 
20 UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/47/135, adopted on 18 December 1992. 
21 For access to the UN Working Group on Minorities see 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/minorities/group/main.htm 
22 http://www.osce.org/documents/hcnm/1998/02/2699_en.pdf 
23 http://www.osce.org/item/2931.html 
24 http://www.osce.org/item/2929.html 
25 Another good source to try to answer in practical terms what would be the practical effect 
of the incorporation of these standards in language matters is Fernand de Varennes (2001), 
A Guide to the Rights of Minorities and Language, available at 
http://www.osi.hu/colpi/files/COLPI4.pdf Fernand de Varennes 
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Applying the principals which can be extrapolated from these, there are a 
number of preliminary indications as to what would constitute the human 
rights of minorities in Bhutan that appear particularly vulnerable: 
x  In the field of public education, quality and non-discriminatory 
education must reflect the linguistic and cultural reality and 
diversity of the population. Where a minority is substantial and 
concentrated, teaching should be in their language roughly in 
proportion to their importance, though this is not to be done at the 
expense of learning the official/national language. Cultural and 
linguistic diversity should in fact be promoted and encouraged 
visibly in schools. 
x  In access to services and information from government department 
and officials, these should be available to a degree roughly 
proportionate to the corresponding to the numerical importance of 
the language used by a minority. 
x  In matters of private language use (and private religious practices), 
Bhutanese authorities are not to prevent their free usage or 
enjoyment by individuals acting in their private capacity, even 
when these may be occurring in public. 
x  In matters of participation in public life, minorities and traditional 
communities need to be effectively part of decision-making 
processes, especially those that most directly affect their way of 
life and culture 
In addition to public participation, education and language, compliance 
with international human rights would also impact minorities in the 
following fields: 
x  Development activities cannot be discriminatory, in the sense of 
being aimed at or have the result of being enjoyed mainly or 
exclusively some racial/ethnic groups within Bhutan 
x  Land ownership rights cannot be discriminatory (also affects 
returning refugees) 
x  Naturalisation criteria for citizenship cannot be discriminatory, nor 
lead to statelessness, particularly in the case of children and 
women. Addressing this issue also impacts directly on refugees CONSTITUTIONALISING DISCRIMINATION IN BHUTAN 
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and their access to resources, employment opportunities, 
government services, etc. 
x  Right to vote or to hold office cannot be discriminatory 
x  Access to health care, housing and other social programmes open 
to minorities on a non-discriminatory basis, and especially women 
and children 
A closer consideration of these issues in Bhutan, and how the supposedly 
‘democratic’ Constitution of the Kingdom of Bhutan appears to enshrine 
the denial of the international human rights of very large segments of the 
population of Bhutan, follows.  
5. Minorities: Diversity and Denial 
Accommodating people’s growing demands for their inclusion in 
society, for respect of their ethnicity, religion, and language, takes 
more than democracy and equitable growth. Also needed are 
multicultural policies that recognize differences, champion 
diversity and promote cultural freedoms, so that all people can 
choose to speak their language, practice their religion, and 
participate in shaping their culture—so that all people can choose 
to be who they are.
26 
Bhutan’s efforts in many areas of development and poverty reduction, 
among others, emphasise the importance of ‘respect for human rights such 
that rights to education, health and livelihoods complement abstract rights 
of equality before law’; ‘drawing into the mainstream marginalized and 
vulnerable groups with all efforts to strengthen grass roots organization 
such that people make well-informed decisions on their roles in 
development’; and ‘human rights, transparency, accountability, 
participatory development’.
27  
 
What is missing from those official pronouncements and in the laws and 
Constitution of Bhutan, however, is any significant reference to the 
particular situation of minority groups. Non-Buddhist minorities are nearly 
invisible in the detail of any government policies or programmes.
28 At 
                                                 
26 UNDP, Human Development Report 2004, Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World, 
New York, 2004. Available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr04_complete.pdf 
27 Bhutan: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, IMF Country Report No. 04/246, August 
2004.   
28 A few exceptions include the following reference: ‘Religion remains part of every aspect 
of Bhutanese life. Buddhism is still practiced by a majority; of other religions, Hinduism is Fernand de Varennes 
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most there may be a passing reference to the presence of a Hindu or of 
other religious minorities, but these are subsequently often neglected in 
any substantive regard. No noticeable consideration is evident of any 
attempt in government policy or the newly-adopted ‘democratic’ 
Constitution to take into account the ethnic, religious and linguistic 
diversity of Bhutan outside of the Buddhist/Drukpa spheres. There is an 
almost complete disregard for any possible correlation between this 
diversity and minority issues and poverty. Some effort is made to account 
for ‘vulnerable groups’ but official documents suggest that this is 
understood to encompass at most only women, children and persons with 
disabilities. Other groups, such as minorities or refugees, are not 
mentioned. This extends to the analysis of poverty and to policy 
prescriptions: for example, the Royal Government of Bhutan does not 
acknowledge that discrimination is a factor in poverty nor does it list any 
special provision for education for linguistic minorities.   
 
To put it bluntly, official documentation is largely bereft of any type of 
recognition of non-Tibeto-Burman minorities in Bhutan. It is arguably not 
a situation of benign neglect, but one of intentional policy and 
discriminatory rules to maintain the dominance of the Buddhist and 
Dzonkha-speaking population. In this sense diversity in Bhutan is simply 
not admitted – indeed it is perhaps not even tolerated – outside of the 
officially sanctioned Mahayan Buddhist character of the state apparatus as 
will be shown later. The portrayal of Bhutan is therefore sanitised of 
almost all references to non-Buddhist minorities, even though they 
represent perhaps a third of the population or more. While on the one hand 
Bhutan is sometimes presented as innovative with its development being 
guided by the philosophy of Gross National Happiness which emphasises 
‘a balance between material well-being and the spiritual, emotional and 
                                                                                                                
most prevalent’ in National Human Development Report 2000: Gross National Happiness 
and Human Development – Searching for Common Ground, Planning Commission, Royal 
Government of Bhutan, Thimpu, 2000, at p. 11; Household Income and Expenditure Survey 
2000 (Pilot), Report on Income and Expenditure, Poverty management, and Socioeconomic 
Profile of Households, Central Statistical Organization, Planning Commission, Royal 
Government of Bhutan, Thimpu, October 2001, p. 30 which gives the distribution of 
households by religion  (and a total of 21.09% Hindu for the country.); and at p. 2 of the 
Ninth Plan Main Document (2002-2007), Planning Commission, Royal Government of 
Bhutan, Thimpu, 2002, ‘While there are several language groups and communities, the 
country is essentially composed of two broad ethnic groups, the Drukpas  who are 
mongoloid and are of Buddhist faith making up 80 percent of the population, and people of 
ethnic Nepalese origin who are mainly indo-aryan and of Hindu faith.’ CONSTITUTIONALISING DISCRIMINATION IN BHUTAN 
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cultural well-being of an individual and the society’,
29 this is in the end 
nullified by government policies, legislation and constitution which deny 
any consideration of the needs that are not those of traditional Buddhist, 
majority ethnic Bhutanese.  
 
Four major areas have been identified as pillars of this concept of Gross 
National Happiness, two of which – preservation and promotion of cultural 
heritage and good governance – could be thought to have important 
consequences for minorities and could serve as entry points into 
government policies affecting minorities. In reality, any discussion of 
minority issues is practically taboo and therefore excluded or at the very 
least hidden away in all Royal Government of Bhutan documents dealing 
with rights, poverty and development. 
 
Official documentation and government policies all present Bhutan as a 
Mahayana Buddhist kingdom to the almost complete exclusion of all 
others. While emphasising the importance of preserving and promoting the 
state’s historical and cultural traditions, these are seen and presented from 
a Buddhist perspective with the official Dzongkha language playing a 
central unifying role. There is at most a passing reference to ‘others’, such 
as in the Ninth Main Document (2002-2007) of the Royal Government of 
Bhutan’s Planning Commission, which enumerates various measures for 
the protection and restoration of ancient Buddhist temples, monasteries 
and stupas, then adds that in addition to supporting Dzongkha, adequate 
provisions will be made for ‘other traditional regional languages and 
dialects’. Arguably, even this is not much as a concession, as these 
‘traditional’ languages and dialect could be interpreted to exclude the 
Nepali language, since it might be relegated as a non-traditional 
importation. 
 
Many other examples can be given, but suffice to mention just a few: 
 
The emergence of Bhutan as a nation state has been dependent 
upon the articulation of a distinct Bhutanese identity, founded 
upon our Buddhist beliefs and values, and the promotion of a 
common language. These have been defining elements in our 
history and they have made it possible to unify the country and to 
achieve national homogeneity and cohesion among various 
linguistic and ethnic groups. This identity, manifest in the concept 
                                                 
29 Department of Planning, Ministry of Finance, Royal Government of Bhutan, Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper: A Cover Note to the Ninth Main Document, International 
Monetary Fund, August 2004, p. 3. Fernand de Varennes 
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of ‘one nation, one people’, has engendered in us the will to 
survive as a nation state as well as the strength to defend it in the 
face of threats and dangers. It is a unity that binds us all together 
and enables us to share a common sense of destiny.
30 
 
Access to monks and lamas for performing religious activities and 
enriching the spiritual aspects of a person’s life, is essential for a 
Bhutanese. Further, the monastic institutions of the country also 
play an important role in supporting the poor.
31 
 
While some documents do refer to diversity and cultural heritage, this 
actually means a singular culture, religious and linguistic background 
without consideration of any ‘others’: 
 
Our independence, sovereignty and security will continue to be 
dependent upon the assertion of our distinctive Bhutanese identity. 
This has provided the key to our survival as a nation state and it 
will continue to be so in the future. This requires us to continue to 
articulate an unambiguous cultural imperative in all that we do and 
to actively promote an awareness and appreciation of the 
continued relevance of our cultural heritage. It also requires is to 
continue to stress the importance of Dzongkha as a national and 
unifying language. We must also recognize the importance of our 
system of beliefs and values in a world of change, increased 
aspirations and rising expectations.
32 
 
The ‘Main Development Objectives of the Kingdom’ as expressed in Part 
II of the Bhutan 2020 document refers to a number of main thematic 
headings such as human development, culture and heritage, balanced and 
equitable development, governance, and environmental conservation. 
Within many of these headings, minority issues and diversity could have 
been easily integrated. Unfortunately, they are largely ignored, as are any 
mention of development respectful of basic human rights.  
 
In relation to the development objective dealing with ‘Culture and 
Heritage’, for example, there is in fact a very strong emphasis on the 
                                                 
30 Planning Commission, Royal Government of Bhutan, Bhutan 2020: A Vision for Peace, 
Prosperity and Happiness, 1999, p. 17. 
31 Planning Commission, Royal Government of Bhutan, Poverty Assessment and Analysis 
Report 2000, Thimpu, p. 105. 
32 Planning Commission, Royal Government of Bhutan, Bhutan 2020: A Vision for Peace, 
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maintenance of a distinctive Bhutanese identity as a central “cultural 
imperative” of the Kingdom. Though this and other objectives are couched 
in very general terms, subsequent descriptions seem to suggest that this is 
mainly linked to traditional, Buddhist and Tibeto-Burman traditions and 
culture.
33 The promotion of the national Dzongkha language as a lingua 
franca is also presented as part of one of the country’s main development 
objective, but there is no consideration of the position of linguistic 
minorities or linguistic diversity.
34 Buddhist monastic bodies and other 
religious institutions, though not apparently Hindu institutions, are finally 
specifically targeted for special treatment within the development 
objectives as part of Bhutan’s heritage.
35 
 
The Constitution of the Kingdom of Bhutan reinforces the pre-eminence of 
the Buddhism and certain entitlements to Buddhist religious institutions, 
merely mentioning that the Druk Gyalpo is ‘the protector of all religions’ 
(Article 3(2)), and the country’s national anthem acknowledges the Lord 
Buddha. Only the Dzongkha language is given any status (Article 1 (8)), 
and nowhere is there any mention of other linguistic, religious or ethnic 
minorities, nor of minorities having any rights in the Kingdom. The 
constitutional provisions that refer to culture (for example, Article 4) are 
worded in such a way as to not acknowledge any diversity. At most it 
seems to suggest culture is seen as mainly those from Buddhist and Tibeto-
Burman traditions (paragraph 1 for example refers to traditional Buddhist 
sites of interest, such as the Goendey which is a type of monastic 
community). 
 
5.1 The link between the denial of human rights such as 
discrimination and poverty for minorities  
 
A large number of international organisations, including the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), have recognized the vulnerability of certain 
socially or culturally distinct groups such as minorities to being 
disadvantaged in comparison with mainstream society,
36 and the need to 
                                                 
33 See Planning Commission, Royal Government of Bhutan, Bhutan 2020: A Vision for 
Peace, Prosperity and Happiness, 1999, Part II, pp. 37 and 38, where for example the 
heritage artefacts described for conservation and protection seem to be exclusively 
Buddhist, as well as the traditional arts and crafts described.  
34 Planning Commission, Royal Government of Bhutan, Bhutan 2020: A Vision for Peace, 
Prosperity and Happiness, 1999, Part II, pp. 40-41. 
35 Ibid. 
36 The Asian Development Bank defines ‘indigenous peoples’ as a generic concept that 
includes cultural minorities, ethnic minorities, indigenous cultural communities, tribal Fernand de Varennes 
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focus on their participation in development. The recognition and right to 
own property is often deemed a central aspect for development purposes: 
 
43. Key issues that should be considered as the Bank addresses 
indigenous peoples matters, and the continuity and development of 
indigenous peoples communities, include (i) legal recognition of 
ancestral domain and the traditional rights of indigenous peoples 
over land and resources, (ii) recognized legitimacy of the 
indigenous social and legal institutions of indigenous peoples, and 
(iii) recognition of the right of indigenous peoples to direct the 
course of their own development and change. 
 
Minority Rights Group International has also made the linkage between 
discriminatory practices in the field of development, and the negative 
impact this may have for minorities:  
 
71. In the implementation of the MDGs [Millennium Development 
Goals], governments will need to pay particular attention to 
indirect discrimination, which occurs where policies employed by 
the government to achieve the MDGs unintentionally causes 
disproportionate and/or unjustifiable harm in the form of human 
rights violations against minority groups.  For example, an 
HIV/AIDS public education campaign may only be presented in 
the majority language or according to majority cultural practices, 
thus inhibiting the ability of minorities to benefit from such 
campaigns.  Impact assessments for all proposed MDGs strategies 
may help to overcome some of this indirect discrimination. Of 
equal importance are opportunities for minorities themselves to 
participate in the development of proposed projects and to 
continually monitor the impact of such projects through the project 
cycle. The collection of disaggregated data can help reveal 
possible indirect discrimination effects.
37   
 
Here also, land ownership security is deemed important in relation to 
poverty as it is linked to other human development issues such as income 
generation and food security: 
                                                                                                                
people, natives, and aboriginals. ADP Operations Manual Bank Policies, OM Section 
F3/BP, 13 May 2004. 
37 The Millennium Development Goals: Helping or Harming Minorities?, Working paper 
submitted by Minority Rights Group international, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-
Commission on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Fifty-fifth Session, Working 
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For many minorities and all indigenous peoples, land is also integral to 
their cultural lives.  Displacement or loss of land threatens the very 
identity of the communities… While many poor people will prioritise 
land issues, minorities and indigenous peoples have much more critical 
issues at stake (in terms of cultural rights) and much less chance that 
the state will protect their interests.  Therefore, giving particular 
attention to resolving the land rights disputes involving minorities and 
indigenous peoples can yield a high return in terms of achieving the 
MDGs.
38  
 
In a more general sense, it is absolutely clear that systematic 
discrimination against minorities is one of the main contributing factors in 
poverty: 
 
One way to improve poverty reduction strategies is to identify 
minority and indigenous communities and to understand the 
circumstances of their poverty. Minorities and indigenous peoples may 
be poorer because they have been denied citizenship and thus lack 
access to social services. Many Afro-descendants in Latin America, 
for example, lack birth registration and identity documents, which 
limits their access to social assistance and to formal sector 
employment. Minorities and indigenous peoples may live in regions 
that have been under-developed. The impact of discrimination is key. 
Systematic discrimination reduces individuals' ability to benefit from 
and to contribute to human and economic development. 
Discrimination can lessen individuals' prospects for decent health, 
housing, education, financial credit, or political participation. Even 
with pro-poor growth strategies, discrimination will continue to be a 
barrier for minorities and indigenous peoples unless it is tackled 
directly through anti-discrimination legislation, enforcement 
mechanisms and special measures in development programmes to 
overcome the impact of discrimination.
39 
Various and indeed numerous reports and studies have confirmed the links 
between many of the world’s violent conflicts and inequalities in access to 
services, resources, opportunities or political power, which in turn are 
                                                 
38 Ibid, paragraph 73. 
39  The Sub-Commission needs to find its voice on the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), written statement submitted by: Minority Rights Group International, Sub 
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights - 55th Session, available at 
http://www.minorityrights.org/International/int_stat_detail.asp?ID=66. Fernand de Varennes 
 
65 
 
central to poverty issues for minorities.
40 There is however the need to be 
extremely cautious here. ‘Successful’ development strategies may be 
destabilising if minorities are in fact disadvantaged and excluded: 
Development projects that harm minorities, for example, due to 
displacement, and benefit other groups can generate anger from 
minorities particularly when compensation is not forthcoming and 
consent is not sought. Development policies that have a 
differential impact on minorities, such as trade liberalization that 
harms a traditional livelihood pursued by a minority group, may 
inadvertently worsen the situation of minorities. Even when 
overall GDP is increasing, the inequalities experienced by 
minorities may persist or increase, fuelling resentment and 
dissatisfaction with the inadequate response from government and 
international actors… [Minorities] are displaced across borders 
only to find themselves further impoverished and excluded as 
refugees; this displacement can lead to further conflict.
41  
The main poverty risks for a number of minorities may be the denial of 
land rights to non-citizens, which in Bhutan essentially means members of 
the Nepali-speaking Hindu minority who are refugees or may not be able 
to prove that there are ‘full-blooded’ citizens. The most direct way to 
redress this poverty risk is to attempt, as outlined in some of this report’s 
recommendations, to modify the current wording of the draft constitution 
(and existing legislation) so that it is not discriminatory in the requirements 
for naturalisation. Failure to do so, and adoption of a constitution which 
limits the right to land ownership to citizens with minorities such as the 
Lhotshampas finding it extremely difficult if not impossible to be 
naturalised, would mean that they will be effectively and probably 
permanently excluded from many of the benefits which may flow from 
development activities linked to land rights.  
 
In terms of land ownership and its ensuing potential effects on poverty and 
development activities, the Royal Government of Bhutan has been 
resettling Drukpa Bhutanese in the southern part of the country on lands 
formerly owned by ethnic Nepalese who are now living in refugee camps. 
Contrary to some official statements, not all the land is being given to 
                                                 
40 See generally the UNDP Human Development Report 2004, Cultural Liberty in Today’s 
Diverse World, New York, 15 July 2004, and Fernand de Varennes, Minority Rights and the 
Prevention of Ethnic Conflicts, Working Paper, United Nations Working Group on the 
Rights of Minorities, 10 May 2000, E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2000/CRP.3, Geneva, Switzerland. 
41  UNDP Policy Note on Minorities Project, Background paper prepared by Minority 
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landless northern Bhutanese citizens. Reports by Habitat International, for 
example, point out that some soldiers and police officers have been 
receiving some land holdings, especially those closer to roads.
42  Because 
no land can be owned by a non-Bhutanese citizen and legislation in place 
also provides for the recovery of abandoned agricultural land by 
authorities, tens of thousands of Lhotshampas who left the country are 
likely to have lost all of their property, though some have received some 
compensation at the time of their departure. Potentially, even if many of 
these were to return (though this appears unlikely since almost all of these 
would have to re-apply for citizenship and cannot comply with the very 
strict naturalisation requirements), they would be destined to severe 
hardship and threatening poverty because of their lost of land rights. This 
is once again a policy which is potentially discriminatory, as it has a clear-
cut ethnic and religious dimension.   
 
Other minority groups may have particular land use patterns based on 
traditional livelihoods (e.g. pastoralist yak herders). Protection of their 
land is therefore linked to protection of their cultural identity, a key feature 
of minority rights. The Ninth Plan foresees the review of land-use policies 
and related legislation.
43 It is important that accommodation is made for 
the traditional practices of minority groups in land-use, so that they are 
able to pursue a sustainable pattern of land-use that meets their stated 
development needs, rather than displacing or resettling such groups against 
their wishes.   
5.2 The emasculation of the human rights of minorities in the new 
constitution 
While the cultural, linguistic and religious tableau of Bhutan is one of 
great diversity, this is not recognised to any significant extent in the 
country’s legal regime, including the constitution. The vision of Bhutan as 
a society is, despite its diversity, currently defensive: in order to ensure its 
‘cultural imperative’, a monolingual, mono-religious view of the Kingdom 
is enforced, sometimes against the will of many of its large minority 
populations and in breach of a number of fundamental human rights. 
After the expulsion of many ethnic Nepalese in the early 1990s, 
discriminatory measures with regard to ethnic minority 
                                                 
42 Housing and Land Rights Committee, Preliminary summary report of Fact Finding 
Mission by Habitat International Coalition, 2001. Available at 
http://www.bhootan.org/news_update/habitat.htm. 
43 Planning Commission, Royal Government of Bhutan, Ninth Plan Main Document (2002-
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communities continued. The law requires that the national dress be 
worn for official occasions and as a school uniform, and that 
Dzongkha be taught as a second language in all schools. No 
instruction in Nepali as a second language was required or 
offered.
44 
The human rights record of the Royal Government of Bhutan is poor, and 
human rights are not protected to any significant degree in the country.  
While the 2008 Constitution contains a number of human rights 
provisions, the document itself – and even its human rights provisions – is 
highly discriminatory and reflects extreme forms of ethnic and racial 
preferences. Some of the most basic of individual human rights 
unanimously recognised as universal in international law – including 
freedom of expression, freedom of religion, freedom of movement, right to 
work, and the right to own property are only available to ‘citizens’. This is 
a rather startling breach of the most basic of human rights standards since 
it is absolutely clear that in international law these rights must be made 
available to ‘any person’ within a state’s jurisdiction and cannot be limited 
to a ‘citizen’.  
 
The  Constitution of the Kingdom of Bhutan systemically enshrines the 
violation of some of the most fundamental of human rights, many of which 
are also part of international customary law. A number of provisions of the 
two treaties which Bhutan has ratified are also violated: in the case of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Constitution is clearly 
inconsistent with, for example, Article 7(2) (freedom of expression), 
Article 7(4) (freedom of religion), Article 7(12) (freedom of association), 
etc. as these are under the treaty available to any child, not only to children 
who are already citizens as restricts the country’s Constitution. These are 
the most severe obstacles for many thousands of individuals,  
 
Furthermore, the concept of citizenship in Bhutan is not race or ethnically 
neutral as might be assumed from first impressions: the Constitution’s 
Article 6 indeed recognises two broad categories of citizens: natural and by 
naturalisation. Unless a person is able to show that both parents hold 
Bhutanese citizenship – and this would affect many ethnic Nepalese in all 
likelihood – they are not considered ‘natural’ citizens of the country. 
Almost all of the Nepalese refugees outside of Bhutan (only 239 were 
deemed to be citizens) need to be naturalized. Very few of them, contrary 
to the impression Royal Government of Bhutan authorities may have 
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given, are able to satisfy the stringent and ethno-centric requirements such 
as the ability to speak and write Dzongkha (which a majority of Bhutanese 
probably cannot write in any event); ‘have a good knowledge of the 
[presumably Buddhist] culture, customs, traditions and history of Bhutan’, 
and ‘no record of having spoken or acted against the Tsawa-Sum’ (a rather 
fluid concept that could it seems encompass the King, the country and the 
people of Bhutan).  
 
In other words, a huge range of rights are effectively denied to a large 
percentage of the country’s minority population which may find it next to 
impossible to establish or obtain citizenship because of these religious, 
linguistic and cultural aspects in the citizenship and fundamental rights 
provisions that are highly suspect and discriminatory. This will 
automatically, almost irreversibly, have serious flow-on consequences in 
terms of land rights, access to services, as well as to employment and even 
educational opportunities. In essence, there is only a refugee problem 
because Bhutan has created one by a definition of citizenship that is 
discriminatory. In practice, mainly Hindu Nepali-speaking individuals are 
‘rejected’ under legislation and the new, supposedly ‘democratic’ 
Constitution of the Kingdom of Bhutan. 
 
It should be made clear at this point that there is in international law no 
general and automatic right to citizenship of a particular State.
45 However, 
as with any other State activity, once a government decides to ‘act’ or 
provide an ‘advantage’ or ‘privilege’, it must do so in a non-discriminatory 
way. In other words, once a government decides to grant citizenship to 
individuals through a naturalisation process or any other procedure, it must 
respect fundamental international human rights law and especially non-
discrimination. On the one hand, it is true that States are free to impose 
language and other requirements as part of their naturalisation processes, 
since the decision on whether or not to grant citizenship is clearly a 
prerogative of the State. On the other hand, since non-discrimination is a 
basic human right in international law, it applies also to language, religious 
and cultural requirements for citizenship or naturalisation purposes. If 
these requirements are unreasonable or unjustified given the situation 
existing in a particular State, then it would be discriminatory if it can be 
shown that these unreasonable or unjustified requirements were intended 
or had the effect of denying citizenship to individuals on the basis of their 
                                                 
45 Though see the slightly different view in Amnesty International, Bhutan: Nationality, 
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language, religion or race.
46 As indicated earlier, the issue of citizenship is 
particularly important for minorities and their rights since by denying 
citizenship to a large number of individuals, some States have been able to 
deny to large segments of their inhabitants a variety of rights and 
privileges. This of course is especially true in the case of Bhutan and 
members of the Lhotshampas. 
 
The Constitution is also in all likelihood discriminatory in its naturalisation 
requirements. As confirmed in international decisions,
47 it is of course 
possible perhaps even natural to have linguistic naturalisation 
requirements. However, these can be from a legal point of view 
‘unreasonable’ and therefore discriminatory if they are unconnected to ‘the 
specific conditions of the society in which the people live’. A 
naturalisation policy which shows a marked preference for the official 
language would generally not be in breach of non-discrimination. 
However, if a substantial percentage of the State’s own inhabitants who 
belong to a minority cannot become citizens, some aspects of the 
naturalisation laws could arguably be said to ‘operate in a vacuum’ and 
therefore be unreasonable if they do not take into account the social, 
historical and demographic realities of the State. The requirements of 
having to be able to speak and write Dzongkha (which a majority of 
Bhutanese probably cannot write in any event); to ‘have a good knowledge 
of the [presumably Buddhist] culture, customs, traditions and history of 
Bhutan’, and to have ‘no record of having spoken or acted against the 
Tsawa-sum’ are, to say the least, extreme and would have the effect to 
excluding a large number of individuals from specific minority groups –  
namely, non-Buddhist non-Drukpa groups – from being able to be 
naturalised. In the circumstances, the terms would almost certainly be 
deemed unreasonable and unjustified, and therefore prohibited from the 
point of view of discrimination in international law. 
There are other breaches of the standards one would normally not expect 
in a state under the rule of law consistent with basic human rights and 
democratic principles. Despite the multicultural composition of the 
population of the country, the Government of Bhutan has essentially 
adopted an ethnic philosophy for the Kingdom which takes the form of an 
                                                 
46  Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa 
Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 (19 July 1984), Inter-Amer. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 4 
(1984). 
47 Ibid; see also Advisory Opinion on Certain Questions, Arising Out of the Application of 
Article 4 of the Polish Minorities Treaty (Polish Nationality Case), (1923) Permanent Court 
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official policy from 1989 of Driglam Namzha (‘the way of conscious 
harmony’). Covered both inner attitudes and outward behaviour, it requires 
all citizens, including minorities, to wear the traditional dress of highland 
Bhutan (‘gho’ for men; ‘kira’ for women) in all public places, and strictly 
enforced this law for visits to Buddhist religious buildings, monasteries, 
government offices, in schools, and when attending official functions and 
public ceremonies. As part of a ‘Bhutanization’ process but also linked 
with one of the nine policy objectives in Bhutan’s Five-Year Plans - the 
promotion of national identity - it imposes one set of cultural norms on 
individuals even if these are from an ethnic minority, preventing them 
from enjoying their own culture with other members of their community in 
a manner which would appear discriminatory. 
Even the Marriage Act, 1980 (amended in 1996) has a discriminatory 
impact on minorities. Individuals married to a non-Bhutanese could not 
obtain certain promotions in the civil service, could not work in the 
defence department or in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were not entitled 
to a range of services such as ‘distribution of land’, ‘cash loans’, ‘seeds for 
cultivation’, ‘treatment abroad’, etc. The children from these ‘mixed’ 
marriages were not automatically entitled to citizenship and would not 
automatically be admitted to schools. The impact of this legislation was 
most noticeably visible among members of the Nepali-speaking minority.  
No human rights groups established by ethnic Nepalese exiles are 
permitted to operate in Bhutan, contrary to freedom of association, as the 
Royal Government of Bhutan considers them to be political organisations. 
Indeed, NGOs are officially registered in Bhutan. 
While there is no law barring ethnic Nepalese children from attending 
school, it should be noted that many primary schools in southern areas 
where the Nepalese are mainly concentrated were closed in 1990, and most 
still remain so till this day. Teaching in the Nepali language was also 
banned in schools after 1990. A system of security clearance forms 
severely limits a number of opportunities available to ethnic Nepalese 
children and youth, since the children of parents who have been deemed 
‘anti-nationals’ will be denied security clearance. The security clearance 
forms in their effect and implementation are highly discriminatory, 
impacting as they do disproportionably against the Nepalese minority and 
are creating for them quite severe obstacles in terms of access to some jobs 
and services. 
Access to employment opportunities in the civil service is also arguably 
discriminatory against many minorities as aspirants to the civil service Fernand de Varennes 
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must demonstrate some written fluency in Dzongkha, a language 
preference which in the context of Bhutan is probably disproportionate and 
unreasonable. 
Freedom of movement is also still restricted, and it too has an ethnic 
dimension in practice which could be deemed discriminatory. Members of 
the Lhotshampas minority in particular may have difficulty obtaining a 
security clearance certificate because of their or their relatives’ past ‘anti-
national’ behaviour, and therefore have difficulty getting a driving licence. 
This also means they may have problems travelling in or out of the 
country. 
While some of the major Hindu religious days are public holidays, this is 
almost the extent of the acceptance of religious diversity. There are 
continued reports on limits to the freedom of religion of non-Buddhists, 
mainly Hindus and Christians, as well as discriminatory practices against 
members of these religious minorities: 
Religious communities must secure government licenses before 
constructing new places of worship. Reports by ethnic Nepalese 
citizens suggested that this process was biased toward Buddhist 
temples. The Government provided financial assistance for the 
construction of Drukpa Kagyupa and Ningmapa Buddhist temples 
and shrines. Monks and monasteries of the Ningmapa school also 
received some state funding. NGOs reported that the Government 
rarely granted permission to build a Hindu temple; however, the 
Government provided some scholarships for Sanskrit studies at 
Hindu-language universities in India. Followers of religions other 
than Buddhism and Hinduism generally were free to worship in 
private homes, but they could not erect religious buildings or 
congregate in large groups in public. There were no Hindu temples 
in Thimphu, despite the migration of many ethnic Nepalese to the 
capital city. However, the King has declared major Hindu festivals 
to be national holidays, and the royal family participates in them. 
NGO representatives living outside of the country reported that 
Drukpa Kagyupa and Ningmapa Buddhist religious teaching is 
permitted in schools, but that other religious teaching is not.
48  
This is unlikely to change despite the supposed movement towards more 
direct democracy under the new Constitution. No political party which 
might support specific minority, region, language or religion would be 
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permissible under Article 15(4). Ironically, this does not apply to the clear 
dominance of the Dzongkha language, Buddhism and other cultural 
attributes of the Tibeto-Burman majority which are elevated throughout 
the Constitution – to the exclusion of all others. 
 
Arguably, the policy objective of ‘one nation, one people’ which some of 
the Bhutanese policies espouse is one which at first glance would seem to 
disregard the diversity of the country’s cultures in favour of imprinting, as 
part of the Kingdom’s cultural imperative, a Drukpa national identity 
which is essentially Buddhist, linked by one language (Dzongkha) and 
culture. In linguistic terms, the (apparent) exclusive use of Dzongkha as 
the language of government is quite unreasonable and unjustified in the 
context of Bhutan, where a very large segment of the population, perhaps 
even a majority, cannot speak or write it fluently. In effect, using 
exclusively one language to the exclusion of all others may be considered 
discriminatory in international law if it has the effect of excluding or 
disadvantaging individuals in terms of access to services or benefits, unless 
justified in the circumstances.
49 While linguistic and cultural diversity are 
values that ought to be reflected in the policies and programmes of the 
Royal Government of Bhutan, it is additionally clear that linguistic, 
religious and cultural preferences cannot be discriminatory. Given that 
large number of speakers of non-Dzonghka languages are disadvantaged 
and completely excluded, only mandating the official use of Dzongkha in 
the name of cultural integrity and safeguarding the national language is 
contrary to non-discrimination.  
 
The effects of this discriminatory language policy for the exclusive use of 
Dzongkha cannot be minimized. In terms of education, it means that 
children from non-Dzongkha backgrounds would tend to be 
disadvantaged. Studies in the area of education show clearly that overall, 
and especially in primary years of education, students benefit most when 
they are taught in their maternal language. A non-discriminatory language 
policy is one where a minority language is taught roughly in school in 
proportion to its numerical importance and concentration, and as 
acknowledged by some of the world’s leading experts in the The Hague 
Recommendations referred to earlier. 
 
In social and economic terms, having one’s language used by state 
officials is a benefit: it creates on one hand employment opportunities for 
                                                 
49 Dieergardt v. Namibia, UN Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 760/1997, 6 
September 2000. Fernand de Varennes 
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those who are fluent in it, as well as shows that the government is 
responsive to the needs of that segment of the population and 
acknowledges their presence and importance. On the reverse side, not 
using at all a minority language despite its large population within a state 
means less employment opportunities for those who are not fluent in the 
official and exclusive state language, less social mobility in the higher 
echelons of the public service where official language skills are at a 
premium, and possibly difficulty if not exclusion from being able to access 
and enjoy a wide-range of public, social and even health services which 
may be premised to some degree on official language ability. In other 
words, the language regime in Bhutan risks pushing a large number of 
non-Dzongkha speakers into a vulnerable and disadvantaged position 
within Bhutanese society, with accompanying risks of marginalisation and 
exclusion. This is not only contrary to the right of non-discrimination, but 
also inconsistent with the Oslo Recommendations and its principle of 
proportionality of use of a minority language by public officials which 
enshrine this and other basic human rights. 
 
Broadly speaking, many laws and policies of Bhutan have a huge 
discriminatory impact, tend to exclude any recognition of cultural 
diversity, impose an ethnic concept of the state that marginalizes or 
excludes many minorities, especially those of a non-Buddhist background, 
and may result in limited access to land, services or employment for these 
minorities and ensue in continuing tensions and perhaps a resurgence of 
violent conflict. 
 
As for the Constitution, in addition to the major concerns outlined 
previously where it clearly breaches fundamental human rights standards, 
there are a number of other sections that seemed inconsistent with what is 
expected under international human rights law. Article 3 on the country’s 
spiritual heritage clearly states that this is meant as Buddhism to the 
exclusion of all other religious beliefs. This is in effect declaring 
Buddhism as the state’s official religion, which in itself is not 
automatically contrary to the global human rights regime and international 
law. However, Article 3 goes on to state that ‘It shall be the responsibility 
of religious institutions and personalities to promote the spiritual heritage 
of the country while also ensuring that religion remains separate from 
politics in Bhutan. Religious institutions and personalities shall remain 
above politics.’  While it remains to be seen how exactly this provision is 
going to be interpreted and applied in practice, it would at first glance 
seem to impose a duty on even non-Buddhist religious leaders and 
institutions to promote Buddhism since only Buddhism is identified as CONSTITUTIONALISING DISCRIMINATION IN BHUTAN 
 
74 
 
being part of the country’s spiritual heritage – something which in all 
likelihood would not only be resisted but also inherently appear suspect in 
light of freedom of religion and non-discrimination. The prohibition 
against anything ‘political’ is also dangerous and would also appear to 
breach freedom of opinion and expression if it prevents individuals and 
religious institutions from voicing legitimate concerns only because they 
are deemed ‘political’. 
 
Article 4 of the Constitution would also be discriminatory in that it seems 
to portray only Buddhist/Drukpa culture as warranting protection and 
promotion. While it is not absolutely clear what this provision entails, and 
there may be scope to include other cultures within its purview, its 
wording appears to indicate that Bhutanese authorities might protect and 
financially support only Buddhist/Drukpa manifestations of culture. This 
would in effect be discriminatory. 
 
As indicated earlier, Article 6 of the Constitution on naturalisation is 
extraordinarily harsh and exclusionist, with requirements that could permit 
rejecting the naturalisation of almost anyone who has even criticised the 
King or government or ‘people’ of Bhutan. From a human rights basis, 
these and the unusual language requirement – given its actual usage in the 
country by so few people overall – make this provision clearly 
discriminatory in effect, as it will serve to exclude large number of people 
on what is in truth an ethnic or racial basis. 
 
All of the fundamental rights in Article 7 of the Constitution that are 
limited to citizens are in breach of international law except the right to vote 
and to hold elected office may be legitimately limited to citizens from an 
international human rights point of view. Indeed, it appears beyond any 
reasonable doubt that the Constitution is perpetuating a form of ‘disguised’ 
racial discrimination: since mainly non-Buddhist/Drukpa cannot be 
naturalised, the limitation of the exercise of these rights to citizens in the 
Constitution perpetuates “formalised” racial (as well as religious, cultural 
and linguistic) preferences that would be deemed unreasonable and 
unjustified, and thus discriminatory.  
 
The Constitution is particularly troubling in Article 7(9) where it limits the 
right to own property to citizens, but also restricts the sale or transfer of 
land to non-citizens. Given the racial preferences in the naturalisation 
provisions of Bhutan, this once again has a racial and exclusionist effect 
against minorities in particular. Mainly members of minorities, especially 
Nepali-speaking Hindus, will lose or not be able to own property, which in Fernand de Varennes 
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some cases they may have been holding for generations. Loss of property 
rights is one of the prime factors in poverty affecting minorities in many 
countries, and this discriminatory provision will thus have hugely negative 
impact and risk creating a poor sub-class of society among some of the 
country’s minorities. 
 
The strict restrictions on the formation of political parties in Bhutan in the 
Constitution’s Article 15 are also inconsistent with international law and 
the global human rights regime. It not only limits the political scene in 
Bhutan to a maximum of two parties: one forming the government, and 
one in opposition essentially, it prevents any of these political parties from 
taking up the cause of particular minorities since its membership cannot be 
based on region, sex, language, religion or social origin, it must be broad-
based ‘with cross-national membership and support and is committed to 
national cohesion and stability’, and it cannot ‘receive money or any 
assistance from foreign sources, be it governmental, non-governmental, 
private organizations or from private parties or individuals’. This imposes 
a significant restriction on the freedom of association which would not be 
permissible in international law.
50 In practice, it also may mean minorities 
are unable to effectively participate in the political affairs of the state, 
since their voices and concerns run the risk that they will simply always be 
outvoted and therefore marginalised by the majority. 
 
Finally, the Constitution’s Article 23 on elections has a restriction which is 
in effect probably discriminatory: the requirement ‘not be married to a 
person who is not a citizen of Bhutan’ would mainly affect minorities, 
especially Nepali-speaking Hindus, who for a number of reasons have 
historically often had spouses from outside Bhutan. Combining this with 
the discriminatory citizenship provisions means that a significant segment 
of this minority population is disenfranchised and unable to run for office 
and be elected under the Constitution. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Bhutan has moved in 2008 towards a defensive ethno-religious, even 
racial, concept of the state. The new Constitution of the Kingdom of 
                                                 
50 Freedom of association is a universal right guaranteed in all major international human 
rights documents: Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 22 of 
the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, and Article 11 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Freedom of association for minorities is enshrined in the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities at Article 2.4 and 2.5. CONSTITUTIONALISING DISCRIMINATION IN BHUTAN 
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Bhutan and the country’s legislation unambiguously serve to reinforce 
what in many respects can be considered a rejection of minorities and 
diversity and enshrine measures that continue the systematic violation of 
many of the basic human rights of the country’s minorities – especially the 
Lhotshampas. The concern in maintaining the political ascendance of the 
Drukpa at all costs and of preserving Bhutan as a Buddhist enclave in the 
Himalayas has unfortunately led to this small kingdom’s having in place 
some of the most racially discriminatory laws and practices in the modern 
world.  